of certification and accreditation – has become more prominent. Industry will have to account for carbon emissions across the entire process of producing hydrogen, including in the desalinisation of the water needed for green hydrogen production in the GCC. The EU and member states should lead on developing mutually agreed standards and incentivi

commercially based hydrogen facility powered entirely by renewable energy at NEOM. By 2025, this will produce up to 650 tonnes per day of green hydrogen and 1.2 megatonnes of green ammonia for export. ACWA Power announced this year a plan to build two more hydrogen facilities in the area adjacent to NEOM. In addition, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have

However, as discussed, the share of CO2 captured in the GCC countries is still critically insufficient. The GCC’s three carbon capture and storage facilities in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE sequester just 3.7m tonnes per annum. The three other GCC fossil fuel producers – Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait – lag even farther behind. In the Internat

Finally, the UAE is setting high expectations on progress over climate finance at COP28. Jaber has criticised the availability and affordability of this finance, advocating an increase from “billions into trillions” in such a way that would not exacerbate the debt crisis in poorer countries. He has also argued for improved accessibility to clim

Yet, the greatest barrier to realising the potential of energy relations between European and GCC states is not technical, but political. This becomes most apparent at the EU level. In the months after the publication of my 2021 research, and in line with the paper’s recommendations, the EU elaborated a roadmap for its energy relations around the